Constitutive Compliance by Janger, Edward
Brooklyn Law School
BrooklynWorks
Faculty Scholarship
2018
Constitutive Compliance
Edward Janger
Brooklyn Law School, edward.janger@yale.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
30 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 104 (2017-2018)
CONSTITUTIVE COMPLIANCE
EdwardJ Janger*
I come to the topic of this roundtable as an outsider. I teach bank-
ruptcy, contracts, and commercial law, so my observations
about antitrust and compliance are trans-substantive; brief, and
offered at the highest level of abstraction. I offer three broad in-
sights about the role of compliance, generally within a firm: (1)
compliance should be viewed as a core topic in corporate govern-
ance; (2) compliance should focus on fundamental behavioral
norms rather than complex rules; and (3) compliance should be
thought of as constitutive rather than constraining. Insofar as these
insights apply to antitrust, there are considerable differences
among types of violations as to which level of the firm needs to be
the focus of the compliance obligation: directors, officers, and
product line employees.
I. COMPLIANCE AS GOVERNANCE
As a starting point, "compliance" is not just a department-
it is a goal of the firm as a whole.' Antitrust violations do not just
happen within business lines. Compliance operates differently on
different levels of the firm. Owners face different incentives and
have different obligations from directors. Directors have different
concerns than officers, and both face different incentives than
product line employees. Where antitrust is involved, the types of
violations that can be committed vary with the level of the firm.
Mergers are arranged at a high level within the firm, while price
fixing and other forms of anti-competitive behavior happen at both
high and lower levels of the hierarchy. Once compliance is viewed
as pervasive, it is more than an "auditing" function. At the top
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level, fiduciary duties and capital requirements compliment anti-
trust compliance by ensuring that the firm has the wherewithal to
internalize the risks associated with its operation. At the operations
level, compensation structures might reinforce compliance efforts
by ensuring that managers both benefit from their successes and
have skin in the game over the long haul, if short-term successes
turn into long-term failures due to violations of the law. These
techniques will help integrate compliance norms into corporate be-
havior.
Treating compliance as pervasive also moves the "function"
beyond the compliance professionals themselves and makes it an
element of firm culture-a topic for firm leadership at the highest
level. This is important because compliance professionals are often
seen in an adversarial posture to the business people, imposing
complicated rules that interfere- with the money-making aspects of
the business. This adversary relationship makes it difficult for
compliance officers to gather information and obtain cooperation.
Compliance can, instead, be viewed as an aspect of firm cul-
ture-part of the overall mission and identity of the firm. Financial
services firms, for example, can describe themselves as "lean and
hungry," made up of people who "eat what they kill," or alterna-
tively, as a firm that "makes markets and invests in valuable en-
terprises." A Systematically Important Financial Institution
("SIFI") might find it important to also make it part of its firm cul-
ture to avoid "breaking the economy." A manufacturing firm can
describe itself as providing "quality products to consumers to im-
prove their lives" or it can describe itself as "pushing by maximiz-
ing market share." Tech firms can make, "malware," or they can
"do no evil." The difference in characterization will guide behavior
throughout the firm, and will suggest contrasting stances toward
compliance with the law. If compliance is viewed as part of the
mission of the firm, then the compliance professionals can work
from a stance of "enlistment" rather than "enforcement." Instead of
sending the message that business line employees are suspected of
wrongdoing, the message can start from an assumption the em-
ployees are honorable and loyal to the firm's mission.
II. RULES V. PRINCIPLES
Law does not exist for its own sake. Legislators, regulators,
and judges seek to influence behavior in ways that further social
welfare. Compliance, too, seeks to ensure that behavior is con-
sistent with the goals and interests of the firm and hence the law.
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A consistent problem in antitrust compliance, securities compli-
ance, banking, and healthcare compliance is that the law has be-
come quite complicated. This complexity may be driven by the
complexity of modern transactions or by the desire of regulators to
catch businesses that are fitting within the letter of the law but ig-
noring the spirit. Complexity can also be driven by industry desire
for safe harbors for particular transaction types. In either case, the
complexity of the rules can obscure the underlying behavioral
norm that is at stake. Compliance may appear pointless and silly.
When a firm is oriented toward compliance with the letter of the
law rather than its spirit, or pushing the boundaries of the law,
compliance efforts seem divorced from rationality and sense.
Since compliance takes the law as it finds it, this complexity
is part of the landscape, particularly where antitrust is involved.
This creates two related problems. On the one hand, legislative
drafters may obscure the underlying behavior that is at issue-the
"why" of the prohibition. Second, courts, in explaining outcomes
may not lose the thread as well. If the goal is influencing behavior.
But legal complexity need not hamstring compliance (or at least
most of it). Instead, compliance professionals need to become adept
at articulating the underlying principles in ways that can be under-
stood by ordinary business people without doing case research.
This is just as true for line employees as it is for high level corporate
managers. Where antitrust is involved, everybody in the firm
needs to understand the need to compete rather than collude. Com-
pliance is about articulating "cans" and "cannots," but it is also
about explaining the "whys," so that unfamiliar situations can be
addressed.
III. COMPLIANCE AS CONSTITUTIVE
In sum, compliance norms need to be incorporated into firm
culture. If the firm sets out to be a good corporate citizen, it will
share with its employees the fact that the duty of the corporation
is not just to maximize profits in the near term, but also to build
the company's reputation as a good corporate citizen; not just as
an instrumental means to an end, an exercise in the firm's self-def-
inition. Back at the turn of the 20 th century, Brandeis challenged
the idea that the sole goal of a business person was to maximize the
return to shareholders.2 The view has not been widely accepted,
2 Louis D. Brandeis, Business: A Profession (Chapter 1) (available at:
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but if the health of the firm is viewed over a the long-term, the
Brandeisian broad view and the modern narrow view of fiduciary
obligation are likely to merge. Reputations take a long time to build
and a short time .to destroy. There are firms with reputations as
both good and bad corporate citizens, and the officers and directors
can choose which type of firm they want to be, and what message
they wish to convey to employees. Just as nations seek to identify
themselves by articulating national values, compliance helps the
firm to constitute itself by articulating the values of the firm as a
whole-by establishing the culture of the firm.
Yet how is a firm with a "good" antitrust compliance cul-
ture to compete in a world of less enlightened firms? Must the
shareholders pay the price? First and foremost, it is the role of the
law to ensure that firms with good compliance are rewarded. But
even in a world where legal rules are optimally framed, the biggest
winners will not be the firms that color within the lines. John
Langevoort has pointed out that in a world where legal risk is nor-
mally distributed, the big winners will be the "lucky" risk takers.'
The big losers will be the unlucky risk takers. The "reasonable"
risk takers will perform more closely to the mean-at least in the
near or medium term. This is where compensation structures be-
come important. Effective compliance and a compliance oriented
firm culture may reduce risk taking. This will reduce legal risk to
the firm, but it may also harm results in the short term. This, again
suggests the importance of compliance integrated into firm culture,
compensation structures as well as compliance processes.
https://louisville.edu/law/library/special-collections/the-louis-d.-brandeis-col-
lection/business-a-profession-chapter-1) ("real success in business is to be
found in achievements comparable rather with those of the artist or the scien-
tist, of the inventor or the statesman. And the joys sought in the profession of
business must be like their joys and not the mere vulgar satisfaction which is
experienced in the acquisition of money, in the exercise of power or in the
frivolous pleasure of mere winning.").
Donald C. Langevoort, Beha vioral Approaches to Corporate Law,
RES. HANDBOOK ON THE Ecol. OF CORP. L. (Claire A. Hill and Brett H.
McDonnell eds., Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar 2012).
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